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Abstract
How much and when should we limit economic and social ac-
tivity to ensure that the health-care system is not overwhelmed
during an epidemic? We study a setting where ICU resources
are constrained and suppression is costly. Providing a fully ana-
lytical solution we show that the common wisdom of “flattening
the curve”, where suppression measures are continuously taken to
hold down the spread throughout the epidemic, is suboptimal.
Instead, the optimal suppression is discontinuous. The epidemic
should be left unregulated in a first phase and when the ICU
constraint is approaching society should quickly lock down (a dis-
continuity). After the lockdown regulation should gradually be
lifted, holding the rate of infected constant, thus respecting the
ICU resources while not unnecessarily limiting economic activity.
In a final phase, regulation is lifted. We call this strategy “filling
the box”.
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1 Introduction
Amid the Covid-19 health and economic crisis one question stood at
the centre of professional opinion: How much and when should we limit
economic and social activity to ensure that the health-care system is
not overwhelmed? This question embodies two simultaneous goals when
fighting a pandemic: (1) To ensure that each infected person gets the
best possible care, we need to ensure that the capacity of the health-
care system (henceforth the ICU constraint) is never breached. Under
Covid-19 the ICU constraint is essentially the number of available respi-
rators, indeed a scarce resource in most countries. It was perhaps best
epitomized by the UK slogan “Protect the NHS” and by the Imperial
College report (Ferguson et al., 2020). (2) The more one is suppressing
the spread the costlier it is since, absent a vaccine, suppression boils
down to keeping people away from each other thus limiting economic
and social life.
This paper extends the standard S.I.R. model (Kermack and Mc-
Kendrick, 1927) with those two extensions to provide an analytical an-
swer to the above question. Our answer departs from common wisdom.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, authorities, news reporting and policy
makers popularized the ideal policy as “flattening the curve”,1 i.e., im-
posing continuous limitations to lower the number of simultaneously
infected in all time periods. This would ensure that the peak of the
curve never crossed the ICU constraint. We show that this policy is
suboptimal. Instead, the optimal policy can characterized as “filling the
box” involving a discontinuous suppression. More precisely, it prescribes
(Theorem 1 and Figure 2) leaving the spread unregulated during a first
phase. As the number of infected approaches the ICU constraint we
enter a second phase where harsh suppression measures are imposed at
once (a discontinuity) but afterwards gradually relaxed. The aim of pol-
icy in this second phase is to precisely stop the number of infected from
exceeding the ICU constraint and keep it constant at that level. The
discontinuous tightening followed by gradual relaxation of suppression
is optimal since the underlying growth of infections is highest in the be-
ginning of this phase. In a third phase, once the underlying growth of
infections subsides, no suppression measures are taken.
The logic behind this result is simple, but bears relevance for a dis-
ease spreading such as Covid-19. When access to a vaccine is not realistic
within a sufficiently near future and pinpointing each infectious person
is not feasible, which is implicitly assumed in our model, full eradication
1See, e.g., the Imperial College report (Ferguson et al., 2020), Branswell (2020),
Time (2020), Pueyo (2020), even Donald Trump (The Sun, 2020) and many more.
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is not possible. What remains then, is letting the infection spread in the
population but ensuring that each person gets best possible care, i.e., en-
suring the available health-care resources are sufficient at all times. But
there is no point in leaving some of the respirators idle (if considering risk
one can view the ICU constraint as being the number of respirators with
a margin). Hence, early suppression is unnecessary and costly. Once the
number of infections reaches the ICU constraint, drastic suppression has
to be installed to keep it below. But also here it is unnecessarily costly
to suppress the whole curve as it leaves idle respirators. Hence, the aim
during the second phase is to precisely fill the ICU capacity. Once the
infection rate goes down so that the ICU constraint is no longer binding
– the third phase – suppression can be lifted. The number of respirators
and the time axis can essentially be thought of as a box. “Filling the
box” then simply means respecting the ICU constraint while not incur-
ring costs to leave idle resources. In the concluding remarks we further
discuss how various enrichments may change this result.
Apart from the policy implication, our main contribution is method-
ological. We develop and show how to fully analytically solve an epidemic-
economic model for the optimal suppression policy. Importantly, the
suppression policy is allowed to be fully time varying. Our approach
is thus clearly distinguished from a large number of recent papers (not
least in economics) that analyze policies numerically (e.g., Wearing et
al., 2005; Iacoviello and Liuzzi, 2008; Lee et al., 2011; Kar and Batabyal,
2011; Iacoviello and Stasio, 2013; Giamberardino and Iacoviello, 2017;
Gollier, 2020; Wang, 2020; Farboodi et al, 2020; Eichenbaum et al.,
2020; Alvarez et al, 2020). In order to make analytical headway we
abstract from many nuances that such, numerical, papers consider in-
cluding the possibility of testing (Gollier, 2020; Wang, 2020, Berger et
al., 2020), the arrival of a vaccine (Zaman et al., 2008; Iacoviello and Li-
uzzi, 2008; Lee et al., 2011; Kar and Batabyal, 2011; Giamberardino and
Iacoviello, 2017; Farboodi et al, 2020), treatment and education (e.g.,
Bakare et al., 2014) group heterogeneity (e.g., Shim, 2013; Sjödin, 2020),
contact tracing (see, e.g., Wearing et al., 2005; McCaw and McVernon,
2007; Britton and Malmberg, 2020; and references therein), time de-
lays (Zaman et al., 2009), network effects (e.g., Gourdin, 2011), regional
breakdown (Favero et al., 2020) and individual decision making (Far-
boodi et al, 2020; Eichebaum et al., 2020). Our exercise is a stepping
stone for considering also such aspects in future work. To our knowledge
ours is the first paper to at all consider optimal policy under an ICU
constraint.2
2In a rich numerical model Favero et al. (2020) analyze ways to restart the Italian
economy. They do take into account that ICU capacity is limited among many other
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In the epidemiology literature there exist other papers with analyt-
ical solutions for optimal policy.3 For a literature review on the early
research see Wickwire (1977). Many papers model vaccinations (Mor-
ton and Wickwire, 1974; Ledzewicz and Schättler, 2011; Hu and Zou,
2014, Laguzet and Turinici, 2015; Maurer and de Pinho, 2015), some
model screening (Ainseba & Iannelli, 2012). The previous papers fo-
cusing on suppression (or quarantine) either restrict the policy (e.g.,
diLauro et al., 2020, see also Nowzari 2016 for a review) or abstract
from the fact that increasing the suppression is costly, obviously a key
aspect of any economic analysis.4 A complementary paper to ours is by
Toxvaerd (2020). He has a different research question and, indeed, a dif-
ferent model than us, focusing on individual choice of social distancing
(a form of self-suppression). He does not analyze social optimality and
abstracts from the ICU capacity which are the focus of our paper. Yet,
interestingly, Toxvaerd (2020) finds that individuals may, by their own
individual choices, collectively create an infection spread which graphi-
cally looks similar to the one that we show is optimal. The paper closest
to ours is an elegant analysis by Kruse and Strack (2020). They also look
at optimal suppression with costs which are increasing in suppression.
They show existence of an optimizer for a rather general health-cost
function but only solve for the optimizer in the special case where the
health costs are linear in the number of currently infected.5 This is
equivalent to assuming that the total number of deaths (over time) is
proportional to the total number of infected (the linearity assumption
things and analyze a subset of policy options (containing not only suppression) but
not global optimality.
3There is a much larger literature studying epidemics without controls, of course,
see for instance Dickison et al (2012) and Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2011), Pastor-
Satorras et al. (2015) and references therein.
4Many papers analytically solve for a suppression policy while respecting a budget
constraint (Hansen and Day, 2011; Bolzoni et al., 2019) or a time constraint (so that
the suppression cannot be too long, Morris et al 2020) but disregarding that more
suppression within a time period is costlier than less suppression (Bolzoni et al., 2017;
Piunovskiy et al., 2019). This is isomorphic to restricting the suppression policy to
be binary since, once there is suppression within a time period, it may as well be
at full force. We allow the suppression policy to take any value within a period and
change in any way between time periods. Grigorieva et al. (2016) and Grigorieva and
Khailov (2014) analyze an objective of minimizing the number of infectious during
or at some end period, but the control bears no cost. Abakus (1973) and Behncke
(2000) analyze an objective of minimizing the total (over time) number of infected
(see Behncke, 2000, Section 3) but the cost of putting a person in quarantine is only
taken once so is independent of the length of quarantine. Finally, Gonzales-Eiras
and Niepelt (2020) analyze an S.I. model, finding, just like some of the papers above,
that the optimal control is binary.
5They also show existence of an optimizer for when a vaccine can arrive.
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implies bang-bang solutions for suppression) so it does not (directly)
matter how many are infected at the same time like is the focus of our
paper (in that sense, their paper is similar to Grigorieva et al., 2016, and
Grigorieva and Khailov, 2014). Our contribution is thus complementary
to theirs since we study a health cost which specifically captures the
overwhelming of the health-care system.
2 Model
Our model setup closely follows the canonical Susceptible-Infectious-
Removed model (Kermack and McKendrick 1927; see also Brauer and
Castillo-Chavez, 2011, for an excellent overview). At any time t ě 0, let
x ptq be the population share of individuals who at time t are suscepti-
ble to the infection, and let y ptq be the population share of individuals
who are infected at time t. All infected individuals are assumed to be
contagious, and population shares are defined with respect to the initial
population size, N . Let λ ptq be the rate at time t of pairwise meet-
ings between susceptible and infected, and let q ptq be the probability of
contagion when an infected person meets a susceptible person at time
t. Write b ptq “ λ ptq q ptq. Infected individuals are removed from the
population at rate α ą 0.6 This may be either because they get immune
or because they die. An important assumption is that those who are
infected never again become susceptible.
The population dynamic is then defined by the following simple sys-
tem of ordinary differential equations:"
9x ptq “ ´b ptq y ptqx ptq
9y ptq “ b ptq y ptqx ptq ´ αy ptq (1)
The initial condition is x p0q “ 1 ´ ε and y p0q “ ε, for some ε P
p0, 1q. That is, the infection enters the population at time zero in
a population share ε ą 0. The state space of this dynamic is ∆ “ px, yq P R2` : x` y ď 1(. The only difference from the standard S.I.R.
model is that the propagation coefficient b ptq, instead of being a con-
stant over time, say, b ptq “ β ą 0 for all t ě 0, we here allow it to vary
over time.7
Indeed, we will view b : R` Ñ R` as a function in the hands of a
social planner who strives to minimize the economic and social costs of
shutting down parts of the economy and social life in the population,
6Implicitly this assumes that the duration of the infection in an individual is an
i.i.d. exponentially distributed random variable with mean value 1{α.
7If z ptq denotes the population share of removed individuals in a standard S.I.R.
model, then its dynamic is 9z ptq “ αy ptq, and x ptq ` y ptq ` z ptq “ 1 at all times
t ě 0.
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while never letting the population share of infected individuals, y ptq,
exceed an exogenously given level γ. The latter is interpreted as the ca-
pacity of the health-care system to treat infected patients. We refer to
it as the ICU capacity or constraint.8 It is meant to capture a situation,
such as under Covid-19, where if the number of simultaneously and se-
riously ill exceeds the number of respirators implies instant death. Not
breaching the ICU capacity thus ensures that all get the best possible
care.9
We assume that the cost of keeping b ptq below its natural, or un-
regulated level β is a linear function of the difference, while there is no
cost of moving b ptq above β. The latter assumption is made to “tilt the
table” against us in the subsequent analysis, where we will show that it
is suboptimal to enhance the propagation of the infection even if this can
be done at no cost. Formally, the cost function C : B Ñ R` is defined by
C pbq “ ş8
0
rβ ´ b ptqs` dt, and the social planner faces the optimization
program
min
bPBγ
C pbq , (2)
where B is the class of piecewise continuous functions b : R` Ñ R` that
have finitely many points of discontinuity (including no discontinuity at
all), and Bγ, for any given γ ą 0, is the subset of functions in B for
which y ptq ď γ at all times t ě 0.10
We focus on situations in which ε ă γ, that is, when the initial
infection level is below the ICU capacity constraint. Moreover, we as-
sume that β ą α. Otherwise the population share of infected individuals
does not increase from its initial value, which would imply herd immu-
nity already from the outset, and thus the social planner’s optimization
program then has a trivial solution; laissez-faire, that is, b ptq ” β.
In our setting the basic reproduction number is R0 “ β{α.
8If, for example, on average 20% of those infected need intense care and the
number of ICUs is C in a population of size N , then γ “ 5C{N . To allow for risk,
the ICU constraint can of course also include a margin to the actual limit.
9In practice this of course is no guarantee against fatalities. We implicitly assume
that those that pass away despite getting the best care are not within the control
of the policy maker. See, e.g., Kruse and Strack (2020), Grigorieva et al. (2016)
and Grigorieva and Khailov (2014) for models where the objective is to minimize the
number of infected.
10To be more precise, we require that there is a finite set T Ă R` such that the
function b : R` Ñ R` is continuous at all other points, and that it is everywhere
left-continuous and has a right limit. We also require that b is positive except on at
most finitely many connected components.
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3 Analysis
We first comment on the set of policies allowed by the optimization
program. For functions b P B, it can be shown that (1) defines a unique
solution trajectory through any given state px pt0q , y pt0qq P ∆ and time
t0 ě 0.11 Trivially all constant functions b : R` Ñ R`, with b ptq “ δ for
some δ ą 0, belong to B. However, they do not all belong to Bγ, i.e., they
may violate the ICU constraint. It is easy to show that such constant
policies belong to Bγ if δ is sufficiently low, for any given γ ą 0. Thus,
to choose δ as high as possible, while keeping y ptq ď γ for all t ě 0, is
a feasible policy (belongs to Bγ), and can be called flattening the curve.
However, such a policy incurs an infinite cost if δ ă β, since it lasts
forever. An alternative feasible control function, with finite cost, is to
only temporarily keep b ptq at a constant level δ ă β, where δ is such
that y ptq ď γ for all t ě 0. However, as will be shown below, also such
“temporary constant shut down” policies are suboptimal. Before turning
to the formal statement of our main result, we analyze some general
properties of the dynamic induced by (1).
3.1 The dynamic
Some well-known properties of the solutions to standard S.I.R. mod-
els hold also here (see Brauer and Castillo-Chavez, 2011). A key such
property is that the population share of susceptible individuals, x ptq, is
non-increasing over time t. Roughly speaking, this follows from the first
equation in (1), since b ptq is always non-negative and y ptq is positive
at all times t ě 0. Being bounded from below by zero, x ptq necessarily
has a limit value as tÑ 8, which we denote x8. According to (1), also
the sum y ptq ` x ptq is strictly decreasing over time t, and hence also
this sum has a limit value, x8` y8. By standard arguments, it is easily
verified that this implies that y8 “ 0.12 In other words, in the very long
run, the population share of infected individuals tends to zero. Denoting
by z8 “ limtÑ8 z ptq the total population share of removed individuals
during the whole epidemic, we thus have z8 “ 1 ´ x8, and Nz8 is
approximately (for large N), the total number of infected individuals
during the epidemic.
Let us now consider the solution to (1) through any given state
px pt0q , y pt0qq P ∆ and time t0 ě 0, where 0 ă x pt0q ă 1 and 0 ă
y pt0q ă 1. Dividing both sides of the first equation in (1) by x ptq ą 0
11See Appendix for a proof. For this class of functions b, the time derivatives in (1)
represent left derivatives. The solution trajectories px ptq , y ptqqtą0 are then uniquely
determined and are continuous in t.
12If y8 ą 0, then x ptq ` y ptq Ñ ´8.
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and integrating, one obtains
lnpx ptqq “ lnpx pt0qq ´
ż t
t0
b psq y psq ds @t ě t0.
Moreover, integrating the sum of the two equations in (1), we obtain
x ptq ` y ptq “ x pt0q ` y pt0q ´ α
ż t
t0
y psq ds @t ě t0.
3.1.1 Constant policy
In particular, if b ptq “ δ ą 0 for all t ě t0, for some δ ą 0, then for all
t ě t0:
ln
x ptq
x pt0q “ ´δ
ż t
t0
y psq ds “ δ
α
rx ptq ´ x pt0q ` y ptq ´ y pt0qs ,
or
y ptq “ y pt0q ` α
δ
ln
ˆ
x ptq
x pt0q
˙
´ x ptq ` x pt0q @t ě t0. (3)
This equation is well-known for S.I.R. models. Moreover, (3) implies
that px ptq , y ptqq Ñ px8, 0q P ∆, where x8 by continuity solves (3) for
y ptq “ 0, so
x8 “ α
δ
ln
x8
x pt0q ` x pt0q ` y pt0q . (4)
Since x ptq is strictly decreasing, x8 ă x pt0q. It is easily verified that
the fixed-point equation (4) has a unique solution x8 P p0, x pt0qq.13
Equation (4) will later be used to calculate the population share that
were infected during the whole epidemic under the optimal suppression
policy.
The value
yˆ “ sup
tě0
y ptq
is the peak infection level. It obtains when 9y ptq “ 0, or, equivalently
(by (1)), when x ptq “ α{δ. From (3) we obtain
yˆ “ 1` α
δ
ln
ˆ
α
δ p1´ εq
˙
´ α
δ
. (5)
The right-hand side is a strictly decreasing function of the ratio α{δ.
Thus, the infection peak is higher the larger δ is and the smaller α is.
13The right-hand side of (4) is a continuous and strictly increasing functions f :
p0, x pt0qq Ñ R of x8. Moreover, f px8q Ñ ´8 as x8 Ó 0 and f px pt0qq “ x pt0q `
y pt0q ą x pt0q, f 1 ą 0 and f2 ă 0, so there exists a unique fixed point in p0, x pt0qq.
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Once the population share x ptq of susceptible individuals has fallen
below the level α{δ, achieved precisely when y ptq “ yˆ, flock immunity
is obtained; the population share y ptq of infected individuals falls. In
particular, the limit state as tÑ 8 is Lyapunov stable. That is, there is
no risk of a second infection wave, since after any small perturbation of
the limit population state px8, 0q P ∆, obtained by exogenously inserting
a small population share of infected individuals, the population share
of infected individuals will fall gradually back towards zero, while the
population share of susceptible individuals gradually moves towards a
somewhat lower, new limit value.
Equation (5) is particularly relevant for the case when δ “ β, that is,
under laissez-faire. Because if the peak of the infection wave then does
not exceed the ICU capacity constraint, that is, if
1` α
β
ln
ˆ
α
β p1´ εq
˙
´ α
β
ď γ, (6)
then laissez-faire is optimal; b˚ ptq ” β solves (2) at no cost. Since R0 “
β{α, we note that inequality (6) holds if and only if R0 is small enough.
When the initial infection constitutes an infinitesimal population fraction
(ε Ñ 0), (6) can be written as R0{p1 ` lnpR0qq ď 1{p1 ´ γq. For γ ě 1,
the condition is trivially met (then the health sector has the capacity to
receive the whole population). For γ ă 1, equation (6) gives an upper
bound on R0. But if the peak is above the ICU constraint, regulation
has to be implemented. This is the topic of the next subsection.
3.2 Optimization
To the best of our knowledge, the optimization program (2) has not been
analyzed before. We summarize below our main result, which treats
all cases when laissez-faire is suboptimal. If (6) does not hold, which
we henceforth assume, then the solution orbit (3) under laissez-faire
intersects the capacity constraint y ptq “ γ twice. Let τ1 ą 0 be the first
such time and let x pτ1q be the population share of susceptible individuals
at that time. Then14
τ1 “ min
"
t ě 0 : x ptq “ 1´ γ ` α
β
ln
ˆ
x ptq
1´ ε
˙*
(7)
where x ptq is solved for according to (1) when b ptq ” β, and x pτ1q is
the larger of the two solutions to the associated fixed-point equation in
x,
x “ 1´ γ ` α
β
ln
ˆ
x
1´ ε
˙
. (8)
14An analytic expression for τ1 is provided at the end of the appendix.
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We note that x pτ1q ą α{β.15 Let
τ2 “ τ1 ` 1
αγ
ˆ
x pτ1q ´ α
β
˙
Theorem 1 Suppose that ε ă γ, α ă β and (6) does not hold. There
exists a solution to program (2), one of which is the policy b˚ P Bγ defined
by
b˚ ptq “
$&%
β for t ď τ1
β
1`βγpτ2´tq for τ1 ă t ď τ2
β for t ą τ2
Every optimal policy b P Bγ agrees with b˚ on r0, τ2s and satisfies b ptq ě β
for all t ą τ2.
We note that the optimal policy is laissez-faire both before time τ1
and after time τ2. We also note that the optimal policy has exactly one
discontinuity, namely, a sudden shut-down of society at time τ1; then
b˚ ptq falls from b˚ pτ1q “ β to
lim
tÓτ1
b˚ ptq “ β
1` βγ pτ2 ´ τ1q “
α
xpτ1q .
From time τ1 on, b˚ ptq rises continuously until time τ2, at which point
b˚ ptq reaches the level β. In the mean-time, between times τ1 and τ2,
the population share y ptq of infected individual remains constant, at the
capacity level γ, while the population share x ptq falls linearly over time
to the level α{β, reached at time τ2.
One obtains the following expression for the minimized cost (see the
proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix for the details):
C pb˚q“ 1
γ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1` β
α
´ lnp1´ εq
˙
´ β
α
(9)
From this expression it is clear that the lower the ICU capacity (γ)
is the more costly implementing the policy will be. Similarly, it can be
shown that the cost is increasing in the basic level of infection spread (β).
Moreover, since in this model R0 “ β{α, the expression for the minimal
cost can be rewritten entirely in terms of three fundamental parameters,
the ICU capacity constraint, γ, the initial infection size, ε, and R0. For
small ε ą 0, the expression for Cpb˚q, the total cost of suppression, when
minimized, takes the simple form
15This follows from the observation that the derivative of the right-hand side of
(8) is less than unity at x “ x pτ1q.
10
Cpb˚q“ 1
γ
pR0 ´ 1´ lnpR0qq ´R0
This is a continuous function of R0, taking the value zero when R0
is such that the infection peak, yˆ, in the absence of regulation, equals
γ. For R0 above this critical level (see equation (6)), Cpb˚q is strictly
increasing in R0.
The proof of Theorem 1 is mathematically involved, and is given
in the Appendix. It uses measure theory and views the minimization
as taking place in phase space (much in line with equation (3)). For
a rich enough measure space, existence of a solution to (2) is obtained
by topological arguments. Invoking the Picard-Lindelöf theorem, it is
shown that the differential equations (1) indeed uniquely define solutions.
The next step in the proof is to show that the minimizer measure is
absolutely continuous (with respect to Lebesgue measure). This brings
us back to functions b P B, now viewed as transforms of Radon-Nikodyn
derivatives of the measures in question. The rest of the proof consists in
verifying that the above function, b˚, indeed corresponds to an optimal
measure, and that it is unique in the sense stated. In particular, one
needs to show that it is neither worthwhile to slow down nor speed up
the infection in its early phase (before time τ1).
The result is illustrated in Figure 1, where the solid kinked curve is
the solution orbit induced by (1) under the optimal control function b˚.
The dotted curve is the infection orbit under laissez-faire (b ptq ” β).
Figure 2 depicts the optimal policy as a function of time in compari-
son to a strategy of flattening the curve, here assumed to take the form:
keep b ptq at the level δ ă β for which yˆ “ γ (see (5)) until the infection
wave has passed its peak, and then return to laissez-faire, b ptq “ β (out-
side the time range of the figure). The upper panel shows the dynamics
of infections and the lower panel the policy b ptq .
As can be seen, and as expressed by the theorem, the optimal pol-
icy is characterized by leaving the spread unregulated initially, then a
sudden shut-down of society (a discontinuity at τ1), followed by grad-
ual (continuous) opening of society, until τ2, from which onwards the
propagation is not regulated. The time axis and the ICU constraint
create a square – a box. The economic logic behind the optimal policy
is essentially to ensure that we do not close down society while leaving
idle ICU resources – “filling the box”. This implies that whenever the
natural spread is not threatening the constraint, it should go unregu-
lated. This holds in the early phase when only few have been infected,
and in the last phase, when many have already been infected but most
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x
Figure 1: The solution orbit (solid) in the px, yq-plane under the optimal policy
b˚, and the solution orbit under unregulated spread (dotted) . Parameter
values used: α “ 0.3, β “ 1, γ “ 0.2, and ε “ 0.01.
of them also have recovered. It is only when the epidemic may breach
the ICU constraint – the second phase – that it should be regulated. In
order to ensure that the constraint is not breached, strong suppression
has to be imposed when reaching the ICU constraint – a sudden shut-
down. The reason for the abruptness of this policy (the discontinuity)
is that the natural infection is progressing very quickly at that point, so
a sudden break is needed to stop it. This can be seen in the lower panel
by the drop at τ1. After that, b˚ gradually increases. The reason for
this is that the suppression only needs to keep the infection just below
the ICU constraint. Then since over time the number of susceptible (x)
is falling, the number of infected (y) is held endogenously constant and
since new infections depends on their product (b ptq y ptqx ptq) it follows
that b˚ is increasing during the second phase. The policy as a function
of the population share simply is b˚ ptq “ α{x ptq, i.e., recovery (α) de-
termines what share of the susceptible population that can be allowed
to be infected. A few further remarks about optimal policies are now in
place.
It may be noted that the optimal policy never attempts to fully
eradicate the spread. In our model, like in all standard S.I.R. models,
this is since y only asymptotically goes to zero. Hence, full eradication
(a form of extreme corner solution) would imply locking down forever.
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Figure 2: Upper panel: The share of infected over time under the optimal
policy (solid) and flattening the curve (dotted). The horizontal dashed line
represents the ICU constraint γ. Lower panel: Optimal suppression (solid) and
flattening-the-curve suppression (dotted). The horizontal dashed line repre-
sents the baseline spread β. Parameter values used: α “ 0.3, β “ 1, γ “ 0.2,
and ε “ 0.01.
We discuss this further in the conclusions.
Furthermore, the optimal policy is unique during the first and the
second phase but not during the third. The uniqueness during the first
phase is not obvious. To see this note that here there is no reason to
hold back the spread. Then, given that bptq ą β has been assumed to be
costless, why would accelerating the spread not be optimal? The answer
is that, if one does that, then the ICU capacity is reached at a high
speed of infection hence it would require hitting the breaks very hard.
This is not optimal. The multiplicity of optimal strategies during the
third phase is due to the same assumption – acceleration is free. Hence,
not only laissez-faire is optimal, but also acceleration (of which one can
think as stimulus for economic interaction). The acceleration cannot be
too fast, however, as it may then breach the ICU constraint. Naturally,
should we assume that there is a cost of acceleration (even the slightest)
this multiplicity disappears and a unique optimal policy emerges also in
the third phase – laissez-faire.
Compared with the optimal policy, “flattening the curve” implies
costs that lead to idle resources. This is visible in the upper panel
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of Figure 2, where costs are incurred without the spread posing a threat
to the health system – both before and after the peak, suppression costs
are incurred for no reason. The additional cost of flattening the curve
(instead of filling the box) can be seen in the lower panel by comparing
the rectangle between β and the dashed-dotted line on the one hand
with the area between β and the solid line on the other. It is potentially
very large, in particular if the policy maker continues to flatten the curve
long after the peak.
3.3 Infection in the long run
Our results allow analysis of the final number that were ever infected
z8.16 To conserve on space, we do this under the assumption that the
initial number of infected is very small: εÑ 0.17 Recall that z8 “ 1´x8.
Equation (4) is very useful as it implicitly determines x8 for any given
value of susceptible x pt0q and infected y pt0q given some constant policy
δ. Denote by x8˚ the limit share of susceptible individuals under the
optimal policy and by xLF8 and xFTC8 the equivalent under laissez-faire
and flattening the curve respectively.
Under the optimal policy b˚, the solution orbit at time τ2 passes
through the population state x pτ2q “ α{β, y pτ2q “ γ, after which the
spread is unregulated, i.e. b˚ ptq “ β, @t ě τ2. Using x pt0q “ x pτ2q,
y pt0q “ y pτ2q and δ “ β in (4), one obtains
x˚8 “ αβ lnx
˚
8 ` αβ ´
α
β
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
` γ. (10)
Under laissez-faire, b ptq “ β, @t ě 0, and letting x pt0q Ñ 1 and
y pt0q Ñ 0 in (4), one obtains
xLF8 “ αβ lnx
LF
8 ` 1. (11)
Under the maintained assumption that γ ă yˆ under laissez-faire, that
is,
α
β
´ α
β
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
` γ ă 1
the RHS of (10) lies below the RHS of (11), and hence x8˚ ą xLF8 as can
also be seen in Figure 1.
16Recall that our objective function does not put any weight on the total number of
infected, so the results presented here essentially show an “unintended” side effect of
the social planner’s choice. See Kruse and Strack (2020) for optimal policy focusing
on the total number of infected.
17The qualitative results hold also when ε ą 0.
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Finally we consider flattening the curve. However, since in its basic
form it is infinitely costly in terms of eternal suppression, we consider
a somewhat improved version of it, essentially prescribing to release
regulation at the precise moment where doing so avoids a second wave.
More precisely, let b ptq “ δ˜ (where δ˜ is determined to precisely respect
the ICU constraint) until the time τ3 when x ptq has fallen to the value
α{β, since then “herd immunity” holds under laissez-faire. At τ3, y ptq
has fallen to
y pτ3q “ α
δ˜
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ α
β
` 1
which is less than γ. After τ3 regulation ceases, i.e., b ptq “ β, @t ě τ3.
Using (4) with these values one obtains
xFTC8 “ αβ lnx
FTC
8 ` 1´
ˆ
α
β
´ α
δ˜
˙
ln
α
β
. (12)
Using the definition for δ˜ in (5) with yˆ “ γ and ε Ñ 0 one gets that
xFTC8 ą x8˚. Hence:
zFTC8 ă z˚8 ă zLF8 .
That is, the optimal policy leads to a smaller share of ultimately infected
than under laissez-faire but a larger share than under flattening the
curve.
4 Concluding discussion
This paper provides an analytical answer to the question: What is the
optimal time-varying suppression policy to avoid a collapsed health-care
system when suppression is costly? We have shown that the general
recommendation of “flattening the curve” is suboptimal. Instead the op-
timal policy essentially prescribes “filling the box”. In a first phase, the
spread is unregulated until the number of infected reaches the ICU con-
straint. A second phase begins by discontinuous suppression followed by
gradual relaxation until, in a third phase, the spread is left unregulated
again.
A contribution of the paper is methodological, showing how to obtain
a fully analytical solution to an S.I.R. model with economic costs which
are increasing in suppression. Our paper also contributes to the policy
debate on how to fight an epidemic. We discuss here the robustness of
this policy to various perturbations.
In our model (like in all standard S.I.R models) attempting for a
complete wipe out of the spread is never optimal. In fact, it is not even
feasible. Technically this is since the number of infected only asymptot-
ically goes to zero hence a wipe out would require suppression to be in
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place for the infinite future. Naturally, if there exists a maximal duration
within which all recover, then it could be optimal to go for a full wipe
out right away. What makes that hard in many cases is the practical
difficulty in identifying all infected and since in practice the cost of full
suppression (b “ 0) is virtually infinite – after all, people need to ac-
cess food and medical services. Furthermore, unless countries are closed
more or less indefinitely, a very costly prospect, under a pandemic such
as Covid-19 one risks importing new cases.
In the model we have assumed that the only medical harm is if vi-
olating the ICU constraint. If two assumptions were added – medical
harm from the aggregate number of infected and existence of a vaccine
within a reasonable time frame – then suppressing the spread more than
what our policy prescribes could be optimal. Likewise if the number
of simultaneously infected would cause harm more gradually. This, how-
ever, does not seem to be case for Covid-19 where the bottleneck in most
countries is the number of respirators – respecting the ICU constraint
is the main issue. Another factor that could suggest early suppression
is if the ICU constraint can be expanded (for Covid-19 equivalent to an
increased number of respirators or development of a cure or improved
treatment). Another possibility is that one learns about the parameters.
However, for that to motivate regulation early, one has to assume that
the suppression itself does not distort the signal. Finally, if the cost of
suppression were convex, in particular so that small suppression is very
cheap, then that would motivate some suppression early on. However,
it would still most probably be optimal to discontinuously increase sup-
pression to ensure that the number of infected is constant and does not
surpass the ICU constraint.18
We hope our analysis provides a stepping stone for future analyses
of more complex and richer models.
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5 Appendix
This appendix provides a proof of Theorem 1.
Our strategy consists of the following steps:
• The optimization problem is written in the phase space 4.
• The new formulation admits a natural extension on a signed-mea-
sure space.
• Topological properties of this measure space and of the functional
deduced from C imply the existence of a global minimizer.
• A priori a global minimizer is a general signed measure, but it
turns out to be an absolutely continuous, bringing us back to a
functional setting.
• Calculus of variation arguments show that the minimizer is uniquely
determined until the time when x reaches the level α{β, and this
leads to Theorem 1.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no such result in calculus
of variations or optimal control theory (see the books of Clarke [11] or
Liberzon [35]). We therefore give a direct and self-contained proof (only
requiring a first knowledge of measure theory, as can be found e.g. in
Rudin [45]). For the optimization problem at hand, our extension to
measure spaces seems natural, and we believe it is original. The Euler-
Lagrange equations will not be satisfied and the constraints will play
a more important role. This is related to the fact that we consider a
cost of suppression that is linear in downwards deviations, and zero for
upwards deviations. If one is interested in more general costs of the form
rCpbqB ż `8
0
F pβ ´ bptqq dt (13)
where the mapping F : R Ñ R` is e.g. a strictly convex function
attaining its minimum at 0, then the Euler-Lagrange equations admit
solutions leading to optimal policies different from b˚ (but b˚ remains
a minimizer for certain functionals F , see Remark 9 at the end of this
appendix). When F is close to the mapping p¨q` considered here, for
instance if F is given by
@ x P R, F pxqB
"
x1` , when x P R`
|x|1` , when x P R´
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where  ą 0 is small, we expect that the corresponding solution will be
close to b˚. In particular a jump will still occur. We plan to investigate
more precisely this situation in future work.
Let us now move toward the proof of Theorem 1 according to the
above strategy. We assume in the sequel that we are in the “interesting”
case where y0 “ ε ă γ and where the laissez-faire policy b ” β leads
y to take values strictly large than γ, that is, (6) does not hold. This
hypothesis will be referred to as the underlying assumption.
5.1 The phase space 4
We begin by rewriting the constrained control problem of minimizing C
on Bγ as a optimization problem in the associated phase space 4.
Let us be more precise: B is the set of piecewise continuous func-
tions b : R` Ñ R` with a finite number of discontinuities and such
that tt ě 0 : bptq “ 0u has a finite number of connected components.
Let px0, y0q P 4, with y0 P p0, 1q, as well as b B pbptqqtě0 P B be given
and consider px, yq B pxptq, yptqqtě0 the maximal (over time) solution of
the S.I.R. ODE (1) starting from pxp0q, yp0qq “ px0, y0q (this is a slight
generalization of the setting of Theorem 1, where x0 “ 1´y0, the impor-
tant hypothesis is that the underlying assumption holds). The existence
and uniqueness of this solution is a consequence of the Picard-Lindelöf
or Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, extended to a time-dependent vector field
that is left continuous with right limits (instead of continuous). The im-
portant fact being that the r.h.s. of (1) is locally Lipschitz with respect
to pxptq, yptqq. By Bγ, we designate the set of b P B such that y always
remains below γ.
We begin with a simple observation.
Lemma 1 When y0 P p0, 1q, the solution px, yq is defined for all times
t ě 0 and pxptq, yptqq P p0, 1q2 X4.
Proof
As already mentioned, the solution px, yq is locally unique. From this
it follows that if x reaches 0, then it will stay there forever afterward,
since the r.h.s. of (1) is zero if xptq “ 0. Similarly, if y reaches 0, then
it will stay there forever afterward. It follows that x and y will stay
non-negative. As a consequence, x is non-increasing and thus will stay
below x0 and never hit 1. From the identity
9xptq ` 9yptq“´αyptq ď 0
we deduce that x` y will stay below y0`x0 ď 1 and in particular y will
stay below 1. The first equation of (1) then implies that
9xptqě´bptqxptq
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and Gronwall lemma shows
xptqě x0 exp
´
´ şt
0
bpsq ds
¯
so x remains positive. The inequality x`y ď 1 then insures that y never
reaches 1. Finally, the second equation of (1) then implies that
yptqě´αyptq
so that yptq ě y0 expp´αtq and y cannot reach 0 in finite time.
Since px, yq stays in the compact square r0, 1s2, the solution of (1) is
defined for all times.

Remark 1 In particular, since for all t ě 0 we have yptq ą 0, a part of
the population will always remain infectious, whatever the choice of the
policy b: it is impossible to entirely eliminate the disease. This feature
is due to the fact we are considering continuous populations, it would
not be true for approximating finite random populations.
˝
Introduce B` the set of b P B that are everywhere positive (never-
theless, if t is a discontinuity point of b, we can have bpt`q “ 0).
When b P B`, Lemma 1 and the first equation of (1) imply that x is
decreasing, so x admits a limit x8 ě 0 that it will never reach. Another
consequence is:
Lemma 2 Assume that b P B`. There exists a unique function ϕ :
px8, x0s Ñ p0, 1q such that
@ t ě 0, yptq“ϕpxptqq (14)
The function ϕ is piecewise C1, its left and right derivatives exist
everywhere and differ only at a finite number of points. Denoting the
right derivative by ϕ1, we have
@ r P px8, x0s, ϕ1prqą´1
Proof
As observed above, for b P B`, x is decreasing from R` to px8, x0s. Since
x it continuous, it is a homeomorphism between R` to px8, x0s. Denote
by τ its inverse, so that
@ u P px8, x0s, xpτpuqq“u (15)
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Let t P R` be a time where b is continuous. Let u P px8, x0s be such
that τpuq “ t. We can differentiate (15) at u to get that
9τpuq“ 1
9xpτpuqq “ ´
1
bpτpuqquypτpuqq
Considering discontinuity time t of b, we see that the above relation
also holds, if 9τpuq is seen as a right derivative (recall 9x is a left derivate).
Furthermore, taking into account that τ is decreasing, we have the exis-
tence of the left limit:
lim
vÑu´
9τpvq“´ 1
bpτpuq`quypτpuqq
It leads us to define ϕ via
@ u P px8, x0s, ϕpuqB ypτpuqq
since this is indeed equivalent to (14). Its left and right derivatives exist
everywhere as a consequence of the differentiability properties of y and τ .
These left and right derivatives do not coincide only on a finite number
of points, those of the form xptq, where t P R` is a discontinuity time of
b.
Our conventions insure that (14) can be left differentiated everywhere
and that
@ t ě 0, 9yptq“ϕ1pxptqq 9xptq
(recall 9y is a left derivate), namely
@ t ě 0, ϕ1pxptqq“ 9yptq
9xptq “ ´1`
α
bptqxptq ą ´1
Remark 2 From the knowledge of ϕ it is possible to reconstruct b, at
least when ϕ1 is Lipschitzian. Indeed, (1) can be written#
9xptq“´bptqxptqϕpxptqq
ϕ1pxptqq 9xptq“ bptqxptqϕpxptqq ´ αϕpxptqq
which implies that
9xptq“´ϕ1pxptqq 9xptq ` αϕpxptqq
i.e.
9xptq“α ϕpxptqq
1` ϕ1pxptqq
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So when ϕ1 is Lipschitzian, we can solve this ODE to reconstruct x B
pxptqqtě0. The trajectory y B pyptqqtě0 is then obtained as pϕpxptqqqtě0
and b via the formula
@ t ě 0, bptq“´ 9xptq
xptqyptq
˝
This inequality can be translated into ϕ1 ą ´1 on px8, x0q.

To any function ϕ as in the previous lemma, associate the quantity
J pϕqB
ż x0
x8
Lpξ, ϕpξq, ϕ1pξqq dξ
where for any pξ, χ, χ1q P px8, x0s ˆ p0, 1q ˆ p´1,`8q,
Lpξ, χ, χ1qB β
α
ˆ
1` χ1
χ
´ α
βξχ
˙
`
The interest of these definitions is to enable us to write the cost
functional C in terms of ϕ:
Lemma 3 For b P B` and with the notations of Lemma 2, we have
Cpbq“J pϕq
Proof
Equation (16) enables us to recover b in terms of ϕ and x:
@ t ě 0, bptq“ α
xptqp1` ϕ1pxptqqq (16)
and we deduce that
Cpbq“
ż 8
0
ˆ
β ´ α
xptqp1` ϕ1pxptqqq
˙
`
dt
“´
ż 8
0
ˆ
β ´ α
xptqp1` ϕ1pxptqqq
˙
`
1
bptqxptqyptq 9xptqdt
“
ż x0
x8
ˆ
β ´ α
up1` ϕ1puqq
˙
`
1
bpτpuqquϕpuq du
where we used the change of variable t “ τpuq, the mapping τ being
defined in (15).
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Let us remove the term bpτpuqq in the latter integral. Replacing t by
τpuq, we get from (16)
bpτpuqq“ α
up1` ϕ1puqq
so that
Cpbq“
ż x0
x8
ˆ
β ´ α
up1` ϕ1puqq
˙
`
1` ϕ1puq
αϕpuq du
“ β
α
ż x0
x8
ˆ
1` ϕ1puq
ϕpuq ´
α
β
1
uϕpuq
˙
`
du “ J pϕq

Let us now extend the above transformation to a policy b P B which
can take the value 0. More precisely consider two times 0 ď t1 ď t2
such that rt1, t2s or pt1, t2s is a connected component of the set tt ě 0 :
bptq “ 0u. We recall that this set is assumed to be finite union of such
intervals, if it is not empty.
Let us first suppose that t1 ‰ t2. On pt1, t2s, (1) is transformed into#
9xptq“ 0
9yptq“´αyptq
namely
@ t P pt1, t2s, xptq“xpt1q
yptq“ ypt1q expp´αpt´ t1qq
Since x remains constant and y is changing, one cannot represent y
as a function ϕ of x. To circumvent this difficulty, we allow ϕ to jump
at xpt1q, taking
ϕpxpt1qqB ypt1q
ϕpxpt1q´qB ypt2q “ ypt1q expp´αpt2 ´ t1qq
This is illustrated in the following diagram:
x
y = 𝜑(𝑥)
y(𝑡1)
y(𝑡2)
x 𝑡1 = x(𝑡2)
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The contribution of the period pt1, t2s to the cost Cpbq isż t2
t1
pβ ´ 0q` dt“ βpt2 ´ t1q “ β
α
ln
ˆ
ypt1q
ypt2q
˙
“ β
α
ln
ˆ
ϕpxpt1q
ϕpxpt1q´q
˙
The above observations are also valid, but trivial, when t2 “ t1.
A priori, our definition of B does not exclude the fact that t2 “ `8,
namely that b ends up vanishing identically after t1. By convention in
this case ϕpxpt1q´q “ 0 and the above formula gives an infinite contribu-
tion to the cost, which is coherent with the fact that
ş`8
t1
pβ´ bptqq` dt “ş`8
t1
β dt “ `8. Since this situation is not interesting for our optimiza-
tion problem, we exclude it from our considerations and from now on
the connected components of tb “ 0u are assumed to be bounded.
Repeating the above treatment to all the connected components of
tb “ 0u and extending Lemmas 2 and 3 to the connected components of
tb ą 0u, we can associate to any b P B a function ϕ satisfying
(H1): ϕ is defined on px8, x0s, takes values in p0, 1q and ϕpx0q “ y0,
(H2): ϕ has at most a finite number of discontinuity points and is right
continuous and admits a positive left limit at them,
(H3): at any discontinuity point u, ϕpuq ą ϕpu´q,
(H4): ϕ admits a right derivative ϕ1, as well as a left derivative, outside a
finite number of points (which includes the discontinuity points of
ϕ, but also some points corresponding to the case t2 “ t1 described
above, since due to (16), at these points ϕ1 may diverge to `8),
(H5): ϕ1 ą ´1 where it is defined,
But the most important feature is that
Cpbq“J pϕq
where the functional is defined by
J pϕqB
ż
px8,x0q
Lpξ, ϕpξq, ϕ1pξqq dξ ` β
α
ÿ
uPpx8,x0s :ϕpuq‰ϕpu´q
ln
ˆ
ϕpuq
ϕpu´q
˙
(x8 is excluded from the last sum, since we don’t allow b to end up
vanishing identically).
There is a point which is not satisfactory in the above construction of
ϕ: its definition domain px8, x0s still depends explicitly on b via x8. It
is possible to erase this drawback with the convention that ϕ vanishes on
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r0, x8s Accordingly, L has to be extended to r0, x0s ˆ r0, 1q ˆ p´1,`8q
via the convention that Lpξ, χ, χ1q “ 0 if ξ P r0, x8s (or equivalently if
χ “ 0).
Remarking that the condition y ď γ can be translated into ϕ ď γ,
we have embedded the problem of the global minimization of C over Bγ
into the problem of the global minimization of J over rFγ, the set of
functions ϕ that satisfy the requirements (H1a), (H2), (H3), (H4) and
(H5), where (H1) has been replaced by
(H1a): ϕ is defined on r0, x0s, takes values in r0, γs, ϕp0q “ 0, ϕpx0q “ y0
and if ϕpuq ą 0 for some u P p0, x0s, then ϕpvq ą 0 and ϕpv´q ą 0
for all v P ru, x0s.
As it was explained in the main text, the most important part of the
above optimization problem concerns the contribution of the restriction
of the function ϕ to the interval rα{β, x0s, since once x has reached α{β,
the laissez-faire policy is cost-free and induces y to be non-increasing.
Let us furthermore assume the function ϕ satisfies
ϕpα{βq“ γ (17)
This restriction will be justified a posteriori (see Subsection 5.6), but
it can also be understood a priori according to the following heuristic.
Let us come back to the temporal description given by pb, x, yq. To get
x8 ě α{β is extremely costly and requires in fact Cpbq “ `8 (think
for instance to the case where x8 “ x0 which asks that b ” 0), so for
the optimization problem at hand, we can dismiss this possibility and
assume x8 ă α{β. Then consider τ` the first time x reaches α{β, we
have ypτ`q P p0, γs. As already observed, taking b “ β after time τ` leads
to a non-increasing evolution of y on rτ`,`8q. In particular, yptq stays
below γ for all times t P rτ`,`8q, while this part of the trajectory does
not participate positively to the cost. Due to our underlying assumption,
the laissez-faire policy b ” β leads y to hit γ strictly before x reaches
α{β. Then if ypτ`q ă γ, it means that for some times t P r0, τ`q, we
have bptq ă β and yptq ă γ. Increasing a little b at such times, will have
the effect of increasing ypτ`q while keeping y below γ. Furthermore this
operation will decrease a little the cost. As a consequence, in order to
find a minimizing policy b for C, we can assume that ypτ`q “ γ. This
amounts to assuming (17).
These considerations and Assumption (17) lead us to modify the
functional set rFγ into Fγ, replacing its first requirement (H1a) by
(H1b): ϕ is defined on rα{β, x0s, takes values in p0, γs, the left limits of ϕ
are positive, ϕpα{βq “ γ and ϕpx0q “ y0
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Of course the cost functional on such functions ϕ is given by
J pϕqB
ż
pα{β,x0q
Lpξ, ϕpξq, ϕ1pξqq dξ
`β
α
ÿ
uPpα{β,x0s :ϕpuq‰ϕpu´q
ln
ˆ
ϕpuq
ϕpu´q
˙
(18)
Our ultimate goal is to prove that J admits a unique minimizer ϕ˚
over Fγ and that this minimizer is obtained from b˚ by the operation
described above. Up to the justification of the reduction of (H1a) to
(H1b), given at the end of Subsection 5.6, Theorem 1 will then be proven.
5.2 Extension of J to measures
To prove the existence of the minimizer ϕ˚ of J on Fγ, we begin by
generalizing this optimization problem by replacing Fγ by a set of mea-
sures.
To any given ϕ P Fγ, we associate three measures µ, ψ and ν on
I B rα{β, x0s via
µpdxqB ϕ
1pxq
ϕpxq dx`
ÿ
uPpα{β,x0s :ϕpuq‰ϕpu´q
ln
ˆ
ϕpuq
ϕpu´q
˙
δupdxq
ψpdxqB 1
ϕpxq dx
νpdxqB 1
ϕpxq
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
dx
(where δu stands for the Dirac mass at u).
Note that ψ and ν are non-negative measures, but µ is a signed
measure. Denote Fµ the repartition function associated to µ via
@ x P I, FµpxqBµprα{β, xsq
Recall that ϕ, as well as its left limits, are positive on I, it follows
that ϕ is bounded below by a positive constant on I. This observation
enables us to compute Fµ:
@ x P I, Fµpxq“ lnpϕpxqq ´ lnpϕpα{βqq “ lnpϕpxq{γq (19)
We deduce that
@ x P I, ϕpxq“ γ exppFµpxqq
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and as a consequence
ψpdxqB expp´Fµpxqq
γ
dx
νpdxqB
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´Fµpxqq
γ
dx
On these expressions, it appears that ψ and ν only depend on µ (in
addition to the constants α, β, γ), so they will be denoted ψµ νµ from
now on.
From (19) we get that the total weight µpIq of µ is given by Fµpx0q “
lnpy0{γq. Let us estimate the total variation }µ}tv of µ:
Lemma 4 We have
}µ}tvď
2

px0 ´ α{βq ` lnpy0{γq
where
B inftϕpxq : x P Iu “ mintϕpxq ^ ϕpx´q : x P Iu
Proof
Recall that any signed measurem on I can be decomposed intom`´m´,
where m´ and m` are two non-negative measures mutually singular.
The total variation is given by }m}tv “ m´pIq `m`pIq.
Coming back to µ, we have
µ´pdxq“ |ϕ
1pxq|
ϕpxq 1tϕ1pxqą0u dx
so that
µ´pIqď
ż
I
1
ϕpxq dx ď
1

ż
I
1 dx “ x0 ´ α{β

It follows that
}µ}tv“µ´pIq ` µ`pIq “ 2µ´pIq ` µpIq ď
2

px0 ´ α{βq ` lnpy0{γq

The quantity  ą 0 associated to ϕ in the previous lemma can be
estimated in terms of J pϕq:
Lemma 5 We have
ě y0 expp´βJ pϕq{αq
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Fix an arbitrary point x P I. We have
J pϕqě β
α
ż
I
Lpu, ϕpuq, ϕ1puqq du ě β
α
ż x0
x
Lpu, ϕpuq, ϕ1puqq du
“ β
α
ż x0
x
ˆ
ϕ1puq
ϕpuq `
α
βϕpuq
ˆ
1´ α
βu
˙˙
`
du
ě β
α
ż x0
x
ϕ1puq
ϕpuq `
α
βϕpuq
ˆ
1´ α
βu
˙
du
ě β
α
ż x0
x
ϕ1puq
ϕpuq du “
β
α
ln
ˆ
ϕpx0q
ϕpxq
˙
where in the last-but-one inequality, we took into account that 1´ α
βu
ě 0
for u ě x ě α{β. The above bound can be written
ϕpxqěϕpx0q expp´αJ pϕq{βq “ y0 expp´αJ pϕq{βq
By taking the infimum over all x P I, we get the desired result.

Consider an element ϕ0 of Fγ such that J pϕ0q ă `8, for instance
the function constructed from b˚ as in the previous subsection. Let
M B
2 exppαp1` J pϕ0qq{βq
y0
px0 ´ α{βq ` lnpy0{γq (20)
The global minimization of J on Fγ is equivalent of the global mini-
mization of J on tϕ P Fγ : J pϕq ď J pϕ0qu. So according to Lemma 4,
we can restrict our attention to measure µ satisfying
(C1): }µ}tv ďM .
Furthermore note that the fact that ϕ belongs to Fγ implies three con-
ditions on µ:
(C2): µpIq “ lnpy0{γq,
(C3): Fµ ď 0,
(C4): µ` ψµ ě 0.
Denote by Mγ the set of signed measures µ on I which satisfy the
conditions (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4).
Up to now, we did not use νµ, its interest comes from the fact that
for ϕ P Fγ, the cost functional writes
J pϕq“ β
α
pµ` νµq`pIq
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This observation leads us to define for any µ PMγ,
Kpµq“ β
α
pµ` νµq`pIq
since the global minimization of J on tϕ P Fγ : J pϕq ď J pϕ0qu can be
embedded in the global minimization of K onMγ.
5.3 Existence of a global minimizer of K on Mγ
The successive extensions of our initial minimization problem worked
out in the two previous subsections will be justified here by showing the
existence of a global minimizer, via abstract topological arguments. It
won’t be clear that such a minimizer fromMγ corresponds to an element
of Bγ via the transformation of Subsection 5.1: this will be investigated
in the next subsections.
Let us endow the set of (signed) measures on I with the weak topol-
ogy, i.e. a sequence pµnqnPN of such measures converges toward a measure
µ if and only if for any continuous function g : I Ñ R, we have
lim
nÑ8µnrgs “µrgs
The existence of a global minimizer of K onMγ is a consequence of
a version of Weierstrass’ maximum theorem through the two following
results.
Proposition 3 The setMγ is compact.
Proposition 4 The mapping K : Mγ Ñ R is lower semi-continuous.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the ball (with respect to the strong topology) BpMq consisting
of the signed measures whose total variation is smaller or equal to M .
It is well-known that BpMq is weakly compact. So it sufficient to show
that the sets
S1B tµ P BpMq : µpIq “ lnpy0{γqu
S2B tµ P BpMq : Fµ ď 0u
S3B tµ P BpMq : µ` ψµ ě 0u
are closed.
‚ Concerning S1, this is obvious, since µpIq “ µr1Is, where 1I is the
continuous function on I always taking the value 1.
‚ For S2, consider a sequence pµnqnPN of measures from S2 converging
toward a signed measure µ. We have to check that µ P S2. Consider A
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the set of atoms of µ, A is at most denumerable and for x P IzA, we
have
lim
nÑ8Fµnpxq“Fµ (21)
We deduce
@ x P IzA, Fµpxqď 0
It remains to use that Fµ is right-continuous and that IzA is dense in I
to extend the validity of the above inequality to the whole set I.
‚ For S3, consider a sequence pµnqnPN of measures from S3 converging
toward a signed measure µ. We have to check that µ`ψµ ě 0. Consider
g a continuous function on I. We begin by showing that
lim
nÑ8ψµnrgs “ψµrgs (22)
Indeed, for any n P N, we have
ψµnrgs “ 1γ
ż
I
gpxq expp´Fµnpxqq dx
We have seen in (21) that Fµn is almost everywhere converging to
Fµ. Furthermore, we have for all n P N,
@ x P I, |Fµnpxq| ď }µn}tv ďM
It follows that dominated convergence can be invoked to conclude to
(22).
We deduce that
lim
nÑ8pµn ` ψµnqrgs “ pµ` ψµqrgs
Now assume furthermore that g ě 0. The above convergence implies
that
pµ` ψµqrgs ě 0
Since this is true for all non-negative continuous function g, we get that
µ` ψµ ě 0, as desired.

Proof of Proposition 4
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To get that the mapping K : Mγ Ñ R is lower semi-continuous, it is
sufficient to write it as the supremum of (weakly) continuous functions
onMγ. By definition, we have
Kpµq“ β
α
pµ` νµq`pIq “ β
α
sup
gPCpIq : 0ďgď1
pµ` νµqrgs
where CpIq is the set of continuous functions on I.
So it remains to check that for any fixed g P CpIq with 0 ď g ď 1,
the mapping
Mγ Q µ ÞÑ pµ` νµqrgs
is continuous. The proof of this continuity is similar to the closure of
S3 in the proof of Proposition 3: both the mappingsMγ Q µ ÞÑ ψµ and
Mγ Q µ ÞÑ νµ are continuous (taking values in the set of non-negative
measures on I endowed with the weak topology).

5.4 Reduction to absolutely continuous measures
Let µ˚ be a minimizer of K on Mγ. We will show here that µ˚ is
absolutely continuous with respect to λ, the Lebesgue measure on I.
Recall that any signed measure µ on I can be uniquely decomposed
into a sum µa ` µs ` µc, where µa is atomic, µc is diffuse and singular
with respect to λ and µc is absolutely continuous with respect to λ. Due
to Radon-Nikodym theorem, µc admits a (signed) density f : I Ñ R
with respect to λ, this relation will be denoted µc “ f ¨ λ.
Using this decomposition, the cost functional K can be written under
the form
Kpµq“ β
α
ˆ
µapIq ` µspIq `
ż
I
pf ` νµq` dλ
˙
where we identified νµ with its density with respect to λ, namely
@ x P I, νµpxq“ 1
γ
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´Fµpxqq
Our goal here is to show that µa˚ “ 0 “ µs˚ , by perturbative argu-
ments. Both proofs will follow the same pattern, but the deduction of
µa “ 0 is simpler, so for pedagogical reasons we will insist on this one.
Proof of µa˚ “ 0
The argument is by contradiction. Assume that µa˚ ‰ 0, then there exist
x1 P I and  ą 0 such that µa˚ ě δx1 . Since Fµ˚px1q´Fµ˚px1´q ě  and
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that Fµ˚px1q ď 0, we have Fµ˚px1´q ď ´ and we can find x2 P pα{β, y1q
such that
@ x P rx2, x1q, Fµ˚pxqď´ 
2
It leads us to consider for r ą 0, the perturbation µr˚ defined by
µ˚r Bµ` r
1rx2,x1q
x1 ´ x2 ¨ λ´ rδx1
(where 1rx2,x1q is the indicator function of rx2, x1q and the middle term
is an absolutely continuous measure).
Let us check that µr PMγ for r ą 0 small enough, namely that (C1),
(C2), (C3) and (C4) are satisfied by µr˚ .
‚ }µr˚ }tv ďM :
Since µ˚ is also a minimizer of K on the space of signed measures
on I, we have Kpµ˚q ď Lpϕ0q, where ϕ0 was defined above (20). It
follows from Lemmas 4 and 5, taking into account the definition ofM in
(20), that }µ˚}tv ă M . Triangular inequality with respect to the total
variation norm implies
}µ˚r }tvď}µ˚}tv `
››››r 1rx2,x1qx1 ´ x2 ¨ λ´ rδx1
››››
tv
“ }µ˚}tv ` 2r
insuring that for r ď pM ´ }µ˚}tvq{2, we have }µ˚}tv ďM .
‚ µr˚ pIq “ lnpy0{γq:
The total weight of µr˚ is always the same as that of µ˚, sinceˆ
1rx2,x1q
x1 ´ x2 ¨ λ´ δx1
˙
pIq“ 1´ 1 “ 0
‚ Fµr˚ ď 0:
Note that outside px2, x1q, Fµr˚ coincides with Fµ˚ , so we just need
to check that Fµr˚ pxq ď 0 for all x P px1, x2q. Indeed, we have
@ x P px1, x2q, Fµr˚ pxq“Fµ˚pxq ` r
x´ x2
x1 ´ x2 ď ´

2
` r ď 0
as soon as r ď {2.
‚ µr˚ ` ψµr˚ ě 0:
Note again that outside px2, x1s, we have µr˚ `ψµr˚ “ µ˚`ψµ˚ , so we
just need to check that the measure µr˚ `ψµr˚ is non-negative on px2, x1s.
The diffusive singular part of µr˚`ψµr˚ is the same as that of µ˚`ψµ˚ and
the atomic ones only differ at x1. Note that µr˚ ptx1uq “ µsptx1uq ´ r ě
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´r and this is non-negative, as soon as r ď . Concerning the absolutely
continuous part, denote f˚ (respectively fr˚ ) the density of µ˚ (resp. µr˚ )
with respect to λ. We have a.e. for x P px2, x1q,
f˚r pxq“ f˚pxq ` rx1 ´ x2 (23)
Identify ψµr˚ with its density, so that we can write (a.e.)
@ x P px2, x1q, ψµr˚ pxq“
expp´Fµr˚ pxqq
γ
Note that
@ x P px2, x1q,
ˇˇ
Fµr˚ pxq ´ Fµ˚pxq
ˇˇ“ ˇˇˇˇż x
x2
r
x1 ´ x2 dλ
ˇˇˇˇ
“ rpx´ x2q
x1 ´ x2 ď r
Let
CB
expp1`maxxPrx2,x1s |Fµpxq|q
γ
For any r P r0, 1s, we have
@ x P px2, x1q,
ˇˇ
ψµr˚ pxq ´ ψµ˚pxq
ˇˇďCr
Comparing with (23), we get that if x2 has been chosen so that
x1 ´ x2 ď C´1, then a.e. for x P px2, x1q,
f˚r pxq ` ψµr˚ pxq ě f˚pxq ` ψµ˚pxq ě 0
This ends the proof that µr PMγ, as soon as r ą 0 is small enough
and x2 is sufficiently close to x1.
Let us evaluate Kpµr˚ q. We have
Kpµ˚r q“Kpµ˚q ´ r `
ż x1
x2
ˆ
f ` r
x1 ´ x2 ` νµr˚
˙
`
´ pf ` νµq` dλ (24)
and for almost all x belonging to px2, x1q,ˆ
fpxq ` r
x1 ´ x2 ` νµr˚ pxq
˙
`
´ pfpxq ` νµpxqq`ď r
x1 ´ x2 ` νµr˚ pxq ´ νµpxq
Note that for x P px2, x1q, we have Fµr˚ pxq ą Fµ˚pxq, so that νµr˚ pxq ă
νµ˚pxq. Thus we getˆ
fpxq ` r
x1 ´ x2 ` νµr˚ pxq
˙
`
´ pfpxq ` νµpxqq`ă r
x1 ´ x2
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It follows that that for r ą 0:ż x1
x2
ˆ
f ` r
x1 ´ x2 ` νµr˚
˙
`
´ pf ` νµq` dλă r
and (24) implies the contradiction Kpµr˚ q ă Kpµ˚q.

Remark 5 In Subsection 5.2, we have seen that the atomic part of
a measure corresponds to imposing the drastic policy b “ 0 for some
time, as a partial attempt toward eradication of the disease (according
to Remark 1 this goal cannot be fully attained). The significance of
µa˚ “ 0 is that such attempts are sub-optimal. From the above proof we
see that it is better to replace such attempts by future softer policies,
replacing a (partial) Dirac mass at x1 by a density before x1 (recall that
x and time go in reverse directions).
˝
Proof of µs˚ “ 0
The pattern of the proof is the same as that for µa˚ “ 0, except that we
have to “thicken a little” x1. Indeed, if µs˚ ‰ 0, we can find x1 P pα{β, x0s
and 1 ą 0 such that
α
β
ăx1 ´ 1
µ˚s ppx1 ´ 1, x1 ` 1qqą 0
@ 2 P p0, 1s, µ˚s ppx1 ´ 2, x1 ` 2qqě 2µ˚c ppx1 ´ 2, x1 ` 2qq
In comparison with the previous proof, the restriction of µs˚ to px1´
1, x1` 1q plays the role of δx1 with µs˚ ppx1´ 1, x1` 1qq playing the role
of .
It is now possible to find x2 P pα{β, x1´ 1q such that for r ą 0 small
enough, the measure
µ˚r Bµ` r
1rx2,x1´1q
x1 ´ 1 ´ x2 ¨ λ´
r
µs˚ prx1 ´ 1, x1 ` 1sq1px1´
1,x1`1q ¨ µ˚s
belongs toMγ and
Kpµ˚r qăKpµ˚q
This is the desired contradiction. The details of the adaptation of
the arguments of the proof of µa˚ “ 0 are left to the reader.

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We have shown that any minimizer µ˚ of K can be written in the
form f˚ ¨ λ. As a consequence, such a density f˚ is a minimizer of a
suitably formulated optimization problem, to which we now turn..
For any integrable function f on I, let associate to f the notions that
were previously associated to the measure f ¨ λ: for any x P I,
F pxqBFf ¨λpxq “
ż x
α{β
fpuq du
ψF pxqB 1
γ
expp´F pxqq
νF pxqB
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´F pxqq
We introduce Dγ the set of integrable functions f such that
F px0q “ lnpy0{γq, F ď 0, f ` ψF ě 0
and we consider on Dγ the functional
Gpfq B Kpf ¨ λq “ β
α
ż
I
pf ` νF q` dλ
We have shown the optimization problem of G on Dγ (which is an
extension of the optimization problem of J on Fγ) admits global min-
imizers: they are exactly the functions f˚ such that f˚ ¨ λ P Mγ is a
global minimizer of K.
5.5 Characterization of the minimizer of G on Dγ
In this subsection, a minimizer of G on Dγ will be denoted f and our
goal is to show that it is a.e. equal to the function f˚ described below.
Define x˚ as the unique solution belonging to rα{β, x0s of the equation
x˚ ´ α
β
lnpx˚q“ 1´ γ ´ α
β
lnpx0q (25)
(the existence of this solution is due to our underlying assumption, note
that x˚ coincides with xpτ1q defined above (8)), and take
@ x P rα{β, x0s,
f˚pxqB
#
0 , if x ď x˚
´
´
γ ´
´
x´ x˚ ´ α
β
lnpx{x˚q
¯¯´ 1´
1´ α
βx
¯
, if x ą x˚ (26)
Theorem 2 The function f˚ is the unique minimizer of G on Dγ, up
to modifications on subsets of I with Lebesque measure zero.
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The proof of this result proceeds by way of a few lemmas.
We associate to f , a minimizer of G on Dγ, the notions defined at
the end of the previous subsection. In addition, we define
vBmaxtx P I : F pxq “ 0u
G1pfqB
ż v
α{β
pf ` νF q` dλ
G2pfqB
ż x0
v
pf ` νF q` dλ
Note that Gpfq “ pβ{αqpG1pfq ` G2pfqq. We will investigate sepa-
rately G1pfq and G2pfq. The computation of the former will be a conse-
quence of:
Lemma 6 The function F vanishes everywhere on rα{β, vs.
Proof
We have
G1pfqě
ż v
α{β
f ` νF dλ “ F pvq `
ż v
α{β
νF dλ “
ż v
α{β
νF dλ
since by continuity of F , F pvq “ 0.
The bound F ď 0 implies that
@ x P I, νF pxq“ 1
γ
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´F pxqq ě 1
γ
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
(27)
and we deduce
G1pfqě 1
γ
ż v
α{β
1´ α
βx
dx “ G1p rfq
where the function rf is given by
@ x P I, rfpxqB"0 , if x ď v
fpxq , if x ą v
Since F pvq “ 0, we get that for any x P rv, x0s, that
rF pxqB ż x
α{β
rfpuq du “ ż x
v
rfpuq du “ ż x
v
fpuq du “ F pxq
We deduce that rf ` ν rF coincides with f ` νF on rv, x0s and thus
G2p rfq “ G2pfq, which implies
Gp rfqďGpfq
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Taking into account that rf P Dγ and that f is a minimizer of G on
Dγ, we must have Gp rfq “ Gpfq and G1p rfq “ G1pfq. In particular, (27)
must be an equality a.e. on rα{β, vs. This means that F vanishes a.e. on
rα{β, vs. The continuity of F then implies that F vanishes identically
on rα{β, vs.

As announced, we deduce the value of G1pfq:
Lemma 7
G1pfq“ 1
γ
ˆ
v ´ α
β
lnpvq
˙
` α
βγ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1
˙
and the r.h.s. is increasing with respect to v.
Proof
From Lemma 6, we deduce that f “ 0 on rα{β, vs (a.e., as all statements
about densities, in the sequel we will no longer mention it). Recalling
that νF ě 0, we get
G1pfq“
ż v
α{β
νF dλ “
ż v
α{β
ν0 dλ “ 1
γ
ż v
α{β
1´ α
βx
dx
“ 1
γ
„
x´ α
β
lnpxq
v
α{β
“ 1
γ
ˆ
v ´ α
β
lnpvq
˙
` α
βγ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1
˙

We now come to the study of G2. Our main step in this direction is:
Proposition 6 We have f ` νF ď 0 on rv, x0s.
Proof
Consider x1 P pv, x0s. Since x1 can be arbitrary close to v, it is sufficient
to show that f ` νF ď 0 on rx1, x0s. The advantage of considering such
a x1 is that we can find η ą 0 such that
@ x P rx1, x0s, F pxqď´η (28)
This property will be important for the perturbations of f we are
to consider. More precisely they will be of the form fr B f ` rg, with
r ą 0 sufficiently small and where g is an appropriate bounded function
on rα{β, x0s and satisfying g “ 0 on rα{β, x1s.
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Defining for x P rα{β, x0s
FrpxqB
ż x
α{β
fr dλ
GpxqB
ż x
α{β
g dλ “
ż v_x
v
g dλ
we have Fr “ F `rG and it is clear from (28) that the inequality Fr ď 0
will be satisfied on rv, x0s for r ą 0 sufficiently small. Since Fr and F
coincide on rα{β, vs, we will get Fr ď 0 on I.
It will be easy to impose that Gpx0q “ 0, to get Frpx0q “ F px0q “
lnpy0{γq.
It will be more tricky to insure that fr ` ψFr ě 0 (on rx1, x0s, since
it is trivial on rα{β, x1s where fr ` ψFr coincides with f ` ψF ) and we
have to be very careful about the choice of g. The construction of such
appropriate g is given as follows.
First note that if x P rx1, x0s is such that fpxq ` ψF pxq “ 0, then
fpxq ` νF pxq“ fpxq ` ψF pxq ´ α
βγx
expp´F pxqq ď ´
with
Bmin
"
α
βγx
expp´F pxqq : x P rx1, x0s
*
Denote
AB tx P rx1, x0s : fpxq ` νF pxq ď ´{2u
BB tx P rx1, x0s : fpxq ` νF pxq ą 0u
Let h be a bounded and measurable function defined on B. Consider
the two functions ξ and χ given on rx1, x0s by
ξpxqB
$&%1 , if x P Ahpxq , if x P B
0 , otherwise
χpxqB
"
ψF pxq , if x P A
νF pxq , otherwise
Solve on rx1, x0s the weak ODE in G:#
Gpx1q“ 0
9G“χG` ξ (29)
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(this is always possible, even with irregular ξ and χ, see (30) below).
Next extend G to rα{β, x1s by imposing that G vanishes there (equiv-
alently, keep solving (29) with ξ “ χ “ 0 there) and define g B 9G.
Note that on A, we have g ´ ψFG “ 1, i.e.
g ´ γ´1e´FG“ 1
It follows that for r ě 0 sufficiently small, say r P r0, r0q, with some
r0 ą 0, we have
g ´ γ´1e´FrGě 1{2 on A
(r0 depends on h through (29) via a bound on G).
The latter inequality can be written as
Brfr ` BrψFr ě 12 on A
and we deduce that for r P r0, r0q,
fr ` ψFr ě 0 on A
Due to the definition of  and A, f ` ψF is bounded below by {2
on rx1, x0szA. It follows that up to diminishing r0, we can insure that
fr ` ψFr ě 0 on rx1, x0s for all r P r0, r0q.
Up to imposing Gpx0q “ 0, this is the type of perturbations fr we
are to consider.
Note that (29) can be solved explicitly:
@ x P rx1, x0s, Gpxq“ eHpxq
ż x
x1
e´Hpuqξpuq du (30)
where
@ x P rx1, x0s, Hpxq“
ż x
x1
χpuq du (31)
Thus the condition Gpx0q “ 0 writesż x0
x1
e´Hξ dλ“ 0
namely ż
A
e´H dλ`
ż
B
e´Hh dλ“ 0 (32)
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Once this condition is satisfied, we have fr P Dγ for r P r0, r0q. It
leads us to investigate G2pfrq. Let us differentiate this quantity at r “ 0.
First note that
Br|r“0pfr ` νFrq“ g ´ νFG
If x P rx1, x0s is such that fpxq ` νF pxq “ 0, then x does not belong
to A \ B, so g ´ νFG “ 0. Taking into account the definition of B, we
obtain by differentiation under the integral
Br|r“0G2pfrq“
ż
B
g ´ νFGdλ “
ż
B
h dλ
Since f is a global minimizer of G on Dγ and that Gpfrq ´ Gpfq “
G2pfrq ´ G2pfq, we must have ż
B
h dλě 0 (33)
So we have shown that if h is such that (32) is true, then (33) holds.
To finish the proof, it remains to see that this property implies that
λpDq “ 0.
We proceed by contradiction, assuming λpDq ą 0. Consider x2 P
px1, x0q such that
λpD´q“λpD`q (34)
with
D´ B D X rx1, x2q, D` B D X rx2, x0q
Find a bounded and measurable function h0 on B such thatż
B
expp´Hqh0 dλ“´
ż
A
expp´Hq dλ (35)
Consider next
h“h0 ` t exppHq1D´ ´ t exppHq1D`
with t ě 0 to be chosen later.
Due to (34) and (35), (32) holds.
However, as can be seen in (31), H is strictly increasing on B. It
follows that
@ x1 P D´, @ x2 P D`, Hpx1qăHpx2q
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and as a consequenceż
D
h dλ“
ż
D
h0 dλ` t
ˆż
D´
eH dλ´
ż
D`
eH dλ
˙
diverges toward ´8 as t goes to `8 (the latter assertion follows from
λpD´q “ λpD`q “ λpDq{2 ą 0). However, this leads to a contradiction
with (33), so we must have λpDq “ 0, as desired.

We can now come to the
Proof of Theorem 2
From Proposition 6, we deduce that G2pfq “ 0 and so Gpfq “ pβ{αqG1pfq.
Lemma 7 tells us that Gpfq will be minimal if v is as small as possible.
From Proposition 6, we also get that for x P rv, x0s,
fpxqď´1
γ
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´F pxqq (36)
inequality which can rewritten under the form
d
dx
exppF pxqqď´1
γ
d
dx
ˆ
x´ α
β
lnpxq
˙
(where d{dx corresponds to a weak derivative).
Integrating this bound we obtain
eF px0q ´ eF pvqď´1
γ
ˆ
x0 ´ v ´ α
β
lnpx0{vq
˙
Recalling that F pvq “ 0 and F px0q “ lnpy0{γq, we deduce
y0
γ
´ 1ď´1
γ
ˆ
x0 ´ v ´ α
β
lnpx0{vq
˙
i.e.
1´ γ ´ α
β
lnpx0qď v ´ α
β
lnpvq
The r.h.s. is a quantity which is increasing with v. Thus we must
have v ě x˚, where x˚ was defined in (25).
The equality v “ x˚ is realized if and only if (36) is an equality (a.e.),
namely
fpxq“´1
γ
ˆ
1´ α
βx
˙
expp´F pxqq (37)
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Integrating this equality as before, we get
@ x P rx˚, x0s, eF pxq ´ 1“´1
γ
ˆ
x´ x˚ ´ α
β
lnpx{x˚q
˙
Replacing this value of eF pxq in (37), we get the function announced
in (26).

In the above arguments also enable to compute the minimal value
of G on Dγ (which is also the minimal value of K on Mγ according to
Subsection 5.4).
Corollary 1
min
Dγ
G “ Gpf˚q“ β
αγ
ˆ
x˚ ´ α
β
lnpx˚q
˙
` 1
γ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1
˙
“ 1
γ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1` β
α
´ lnpx0q
˙
´ β
α
Proof
In the proof of Theorem 2 we have seen that Gpf˚q “ pβ{αqG1pf˚q.
Using the expression given in Lemma 7, where v is replaced by x˚, we
get
G1pfq“ 1
γ
ˆ
x˚ ´ α
β
lnpx˚q
˙
` α
βγ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1
˙
It remains to take into account the characterization (25) of x˚.

Remember this value of minDγ G is only valid under our underlying
assumption, otherwise this minimum is simply 0, as it is attained at the
laissez-faire policy. It should be noted that minDγ G is decreasing with
respect to γ, as long as our underlying assumption is satisfied (recall (6)
in the main text). This observation will be useful in the next subsection.
5.6 Back to Theorem 1
Finally we come to the proof of Theorem 1. But first we have to re-
turn to a rigorous justification of the restriction to (17), which was only
heuristically discussed at the end of Subsection 5.1. We will also pro-
vide an analytical value for τ1 and present an extension of Theorem 1 in
Remark 9.
In the setting of Subsection 5.1, consider a function ϕ : rα{β, x0s Ñ
r0, γs with ϕpα{βq ă γ, and satisfying (H2), (H3), (H4) and (H5). Due to
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the fact that ϕ is right continuous and only jumps upward, this function
attains its maximum, say at x1 P rα{β, x0s. Define a new function rϕ via
@ x P rα{β, x0s, rϕpxqB"ϕpx1q , if x ď x1ϕpxq , if x ą x1
Note that rϕ still satisfies (H2), (H3), (H4) and (H5). Recall the
functional J defined in (18).
Lemma 8 We have
J prϕqďJ pϕq
and the inequality is strict if rϕ ‰ ϕ.
Proof
The argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 6 and is based on the
following computation:ż x1
α{β
Lpu, ϕpuq, ϕ1puqq duě β
α
ż x1
α{β
1` ϕ1puq
ϕpuq ´
α
βuϕpuq du
“ rlnpϕpuqsx1α{β `
β
α
ż x1
α{β
1
ϕpuq
ˆ
1´ α
βu
˙
du
ě rlnpϕpuqsx1α{β `
β
αϕpx1q
ż x1
α{β
1´ α
βu
du
“ lnpϕpx1q{ϕpα{βqq ` β
αϕpx1q
„
u´ α
β
lnpuq
x1
α{β
ě β
αϕpx1q
„
u´ α
β
lnpuq
x1
α{β
If we replace ϕ by rϕ in the above computations, all the inequalities
become equalities, so the last term is in fact equal toż x1
α{β
Lpu, rϕpuq, rϕ1puqq du
We have furthermoreÿ
uPpα{β,x1s :ϕpuq‰ϕpu´q
ln
ˆ
ϕpuq
ϕpu´q
˙
ě 0 “
ÿ
uPpα{β,x1s : rϕpuq‰rϕpu´q
ln
ˆ rϕpuqrϕpu´q
˙
and the respective contributions of ϕ and rϕ to the costs J pϕq and J prϕq
are the same on px1, x0s. It follows that
J prϕqďJ pϕq
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The equality holds if in the above computation of the integralşx1
α{β Lpu, ϕpuq, ϕ1puqq du, all inequalities are equalities and we get that
ϕpxq “ ϕpx1q for a.e. x P pα{β, x1q, namely rϕ “ ϕ.

It follows that in the perspective of minimizing J , we can restrict
our attention to functions ϕ attaining their maximum at α{β, i.e. we
can replace (H1a) by
(H1c): ϕ is defined on rα{β, x0s, takes values in r0, γs, ϕpα{βq “ maxrα{β,x0s ϕ,
ϕpx0q “ y0 and the left limits of ϕ are positive.
To go further toward (H1b), let ϕ a function satisfying (H1c), (H2),
(H3), (H4) and (H5), denote η B ϕpα{βq and assume that η ă γ. From
the development of Subsections 5.2 to 5.5, we get that
J pϕqěmin
Dη
G
According to Corollary 1 (see also its following paragraph), we have
min
Dη
Gąmin
Dγ
G
This observation ends up the justification of the replacement of (H1a)
by (H1b), relatively to the search of a global minimizer of L.
We can now come to the
Proof of Theorem 1
One direct way would be to check that the procedure described in
Subsection 5.1 transform b˚ into f˚. There is even a faster way, as it is
sufficient to check that
Cpb˚q“Gpf˚q (38)
To do so, let us come back to (9) and provide the missing computa-
tions:
C pb˚q“ β
ż τ2
τ1
βγ pτ2 ´ tq
1` βγ pτ2 ´ tqdt
“ 1
γ
ż βγpτ2´τ1q
0
ˆ
1´ 1
1` s
˙
ds
“ 1
γ
rβγ pτ2 ´ τ1q ´ ln p1` βγ pτ2 ´ τ1qqs
“ β
αγ
ˆ
xpτ1q ´ α
β
lnpxpτ1qq
˙
` 1
γ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1
˙
“ 1
γ
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1` β
α
´ lnp1´ εq
˙
´ β
α
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Comparing this value with that of Corollary 1 (recall that x˚ “
xpτ1q), we get the validity of (38).
This argument shows that b˚ is a global minimizer of C over Bγ.
To see that any global minimizer coincides with b˚ on the time interval
r0, τ1s, take into account Remark 2: since f˚ is Lipschitzian, there is
only one policy leading to f˚ (defined on rα{β, x0s).

The expression (26) of f˚ enables us to give an analytical expression
for τ1 defined in (7). It needs the dilogarithm function Li2, which is
defined on the complex plane via
@ z P C, Li2pzq“
ż 1´z
1
lnpuq
1´ u du
Proposition 7
τ1“´ 1
β
˜
x˚ ´ x0 ` ln
ˆ
βx˚ ´ α
βx0 ´ α
˙„
α
β
´ x˚ ` α
β
ln
ˆ
x˚β
α
˙
`α
β
„
Li2
ˆ
1´ βx
˚
α
˙
´ Li2
ˆ
1´ βx0
α
˙¸
Proof
On r0, τ1s, we have 9x “ ´βxy, with y “ f˚pxq. Recalling the expression
of f˚ given in (26), we getˆ
x´ x˚ ´ α
β
ln
´ x
x˚
¯˙ 9x
x´ α{β “´β
By integration, we deduce
τ1“´ 1
β
ż x˚
x0
ˆ
x´ x˚ ´ α
β
ln
´ x
x˚
¯˙ dx
x´ α{β
“´ 1
β
pI1 ` I2q
with
I1 B
ż x˚
x0
x´ x˚ ` pα{βq lnpx˚q
x´ α{β dx , I2 B ´
α
β
ż x˚
x0
lnpxq
x´ α{β dx
Let us compute separately these two integrals:
I1“
ż x˚
x0
1` α{β ´ x
˚ ` pα{βq lnpx˚q
x´ α{β dx
“x˚ ´ x0 ` rα{β ´ x˚ ` pα{βq lnpx˚qs ln
ˆ
βx˚ ´ α
βx0 ´ α
˙
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I2“´
ż x˚
x0
lnpxq
pβ{αqx´ 1 dx
“´α
β
ż βx˚{α
βx0{α
lnppα{βqxq
x´ 1 dx
“´α
β
ż βx˚{α
βx0{α
lnpα{βq
x´ 1 `
lnpxq
x´ 1 dx
“´α
β
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
ln
ˆ
βx˚ ´ α
βx0 ´ α
˙
` α
β
«ż βx˚{α
1
lnpxq
1´ x dx´
ż βx0´α
1
lnpxq
1´ x dx
ff
“´α
β
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
ln
ˆ
βx˚ ´ α
βx0 ´ α
˙
` α
β
„
Li2
ˆ
1´ βx
˚
α
˙
´ Li2
ˆ
1´ βx0
α
˙
Putting together these two expressions, we end up with the an-
nounced result.

Let us end this subsection with several observations.
Remark 8 Corollary 1 provides in fact a quantitative formulation of
our underlying assumption, since it does correspond to minDγ G ą 0 and
we get
γă α
β
ˆ
ln
ˆ
α
β
˙
´ 1` β
α
´ lnpx0q
˙
(in particular the r.h.s. must be positive). We recover (6) in the main
text.
˝
Remark 9 Consider a cost functional of the form (13), where F coincides
with p¨q` on R` and is non-negative on p´8, 0q. Then we get that rC ě C.
Note nevertheless that rCpb˚q “ Cpb˚q. It follows that b˚ is also a global
minimizer of rC. In particular if F is positive on p´8, 0q, then b˚ is the
unique minimizer of rC.
˝
Remark 10 Our extension of the optimization problem to measure
spaces suggests that the S.I.R. ODE (1) could itself be generalized into#
dx“´xy dB
dy“xy dB ´ αy dt (39)
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whereB is a Radon signed measure on R` (in (1), it is given byBpr0, tsq “şt
0
bpsq ds, for all t ě 0). Equation (39) is to be understood in the Stieltjes
sense: for any t ě 0,#
xptq“xp0q ´ şr0,ts xpsqypsq dBpsq
yptq“ yp0q ` şr0,ts xpsqypsq dBpsq ´ şr0,ts αypsq ds
(where x and y are themselves only right-continuous with left limits, in
fact they should be seen as repartition functions of measures). It would
be modeling very erratic policies and Theorem 2 would imply that even
among them, b˚ is a minimizer of the extension of C similar to J (as one
would guess).
˝
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